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ABSTRACT 
How does international tax competition affect fiscal democracy? To what extent does it 
constrain the autonomy of democratic governments in choosing the level and structure 
of national taxation? While tax competition has not reduced the level of total taxation in 
OECD-22 countries, it has revenue effects at the level of selected taxes, especially taxes 
falling on mobile tax bases such as the corporate tax or taxes on private capital income. 
The nominal tax burden has shifted from capital to labor and consumption (domestic 
redistribution). While this result suggests that tax competition has a negative effect on 
national tax autonomy, because all competing countries see their ability to tax mobile 
capital constrained, small countries see their capacity to raise revenue from mobile capi-
tal increased at the expense of large countries (international redistribution). Because of 
these countervailing effects, the overall effect on small countries is ambiguous. By con-
trast, the tax autonomy of large countries has unambiguously declined because interna-
tional and domestic pressures work in the same direction. Given that governments have 
to meet mandatory spending requirements on the expenditure side this may have con-
tributed to higher fiscal deficits in large countries. 
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1. FISCAL DEMOCRACY CONSTRAINED 
What is “fiscal democracy”? The term was coined by Eugene Steuerle but has never 
been defined properly. The meaning is quite intuitive, however. Democracy, according 
to Steuerle, is fundamentally “about equal rights to vote – and have your representatives 
vote – on the nation’s current priorities” (Steuerle, 2008). Since a nation’s current pri-
orities usually have financial implications – they require the allocation of public money 
– democracy is at its core a fiscal affair. It concerns equal rights to vote on tax and ex-
penditure policies. Yet, voting confers democratic control only to the extent that votes 
can make a difference in policy terms. If “there is no alternative” (Magaret Thatcher’s 
TINA), voting is redundant. Fiscal democracy has not only formal prerequisites – equal 
voting rights, but also substantive prerequisites, which are policy choice and autonomy: 
Fiscal democracy is when voters have the power to change the government and the gov-
ernment has the power to change fiscal policies in light of voter preferences.  
In his own work, Steuerle focused on the substantive prerequisites of fiscal democ-
racy, and more specifically on the constraints policy obligations entered by “yesterday’s 
legislators” (Steuerle, 2010: 876) impose on the fiscal choices of today’s legislators. To 
measure these constraints Steuerle developed the so-called “Fiscal Democracy Index”. 
The index is defined as the percent of public revenue available after expenditures on 
mandatory programs (including interest payments on the public debt). Applied to the 
federal budget of the United States, it shows a steady decline since the 1960s (Steuerle, 
2010: 878). In 2010 it turns negative indicating that even before Congress voted on any 
spending program for that year, more than the available revenue was already allocated 
to mandatory expenditure programs. Streeck and Mertens report a similar downward 
trend in fiscal discretion for Germany (Streeck and Mertens, 2010). Other empirical 
studies also point to the long-term accumulation of expenditure-side constraints on fis-
cal democracy (Pierson, 1998). The recent sovereign debt crisis greatly exacerbates the 
problem.  
Fiscal democracy is not only threatened by the expenditure side but also from the 
revenue side. New or mounting obstacles to the raising of public revenue can reduce the 
scope for fiscal policy discretion as well. Our concern in this paper is with one particu-
lar revenue side constraint: international tax competition. We want to find out if, and to 
what extent, it undermines fiscal democracy. The political economy literature is split on 
this issue. Some scholars argue that tax competition harms fiscal democracy by con-
straining national tax autonomy. Others claim that tax competition fails to constrain 
national taxation and therefore cannot harm fiscal democracy. The first position became 
popular in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when radical tax reforms in the US and the 
UK, and rapid advances in global and regional economic integration seemed to herald a 
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new era of international competition (Sinn, 1988, Steinmo, 1994, Swank, 2006). Many 
authors feared, and some hoped that this would lock governments into a race to the bot-
tom in taxation that all but erases national tax autonomy (Edwards and Keen, 1996). 
This concern was particularly widespread in Europe. Economists warned that the com-
pletion of the Single Market would turn the EU into “a single large tax haven” (Gio-
vannini and Hines, 1991: 172) in which fiscal competition will wipe out redistributive 
taxes on mobile factors and turn the tax system into one of mere benefit taxation (Sinn, 
1994). The second position rose to prominence in the late 1990s and early 2000s when 
scholars began submitting the predictions of the first position to empirical testing and 
failed to find clear cut evidence of a dramatic race to the bottom. Some authors con-
cluded that competitive constraints on national taxation were largely irrelevant: Gov-
ernments “wishing to expand the public economy for political reasons may still do so 
(including increasing taxes on capital to pay for new spending)” (Garrett, 1998: 823). 
The notable success of Denmark, a small, open, high-tax economy, seemed to vindicate 
this conclusion (Campbell, 2009: 262).  
Both positions are wrong! The latter is wrong because it underrates the stringency of 
tax competition. As we will show for a sample of 22 OECD countries (OECD-22)1, tax 
competition does constrain national taxation in important ways. The former is wrong 
because it assumes competitive constraints on national taxation to translate one-to-one 
into constraints on national fiscal democracy. This is not the case. Tax competition has 
ambiguous effects: While it undermines fiscal democracy in most countries, it expands 
the scope for fiscal democracy in some (mostly small, poor, and peripheral) countries.  
Five following sections structure this paper. Section 2 briefly reviews the concept of 
tax competition and explains why it affects fiscal democracy differently in different 
countries. The next three sections investigate the extent of tax competition among 
OECD-22 countries. Section 3 scrutinizes competitive constraints on tax rates, section 4 
focuses on competitive effects on tax revenues, and section 5 analyses the redistributive 
consequences of tax competition. Section 6 summarizes the empirical findings and dis-
cusses implications for fiscal democracy.  
2. TAX COMPETITION: SYMMETRIC AND ASYMMETRIC  
Tax competition refers to national governments vying for internationally mobile tax 
base by strategically undercutting each other’s taxes. In order to analyze its implications 
for fiscal democracy, we start with a very simple conceptual model. In its starkest form, 
                                                 
1  OECD-22 countries include Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
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this baseline model features two identical countries sharing one international mobile tax 
base (‘capital’) (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986, Wilson, 1999). The tax policies of 
both countries are interdependent: high taxes in country A swell country B’s revenues 
by pushing a larger share of the mobile tax base towards B; low taxes in A depress B’s 
revenues by poaching tax base from B. This policy interdependence triggers a ‘race to 
the bottom’ in taxation as each country tries to appropriate a disproportionate share of 
the mobile tax base by undercutting the other country’s tax rate. In equilibrium, tax 
rates are lower in both countries than they would otherwise be, resulting in lower tax 
revenues or a shift of the tax burden to immobile tax bases. The effects on fiscal democ-
racy are straight forward. Tax competition constrains the revenue raising capacity for 
both competing countries as a group and for each country individually. The range of 
feasible fiscal policies shrinks. Fiscal democracy is universally undermined. The obvi-
ous antidote is tax harmonization2: 
[I]f citizens are to retain the ability to choose the goods and services they would like 
to provide to themselves collectively through democratically elected institutions, and to 
use the tax system to achieve a more socially acceptable distribution of income, the 
forces of globalization … will have to be neutralized. The most obvious way for that to 
happen is for countries to agree to coordinate and harmonize aspects of their tax sys-
tems, particularly as they relate to the taxation of income from capital (Brooks/Hwong 
2010: 819) 
Thus far, our baseline model assumes both countries to be identical: tax competition 
is symmetric. Obviously, however, real-world countries are not identical but differ 
across various dimensions including country size. The introduction of differences in 
country size (in terms of initial endowments of tax base) changes the results of the base-
line model considerably: If countries differ in size, they no longer face similar competi-
tive constraints and no longer suffer equal welfare losses. Rather the smaller country has 
stronger incentives to cut tax rates than the larger country and suffers a smaller revenue 
loss in the competitive equilibrium (Bucovetsky, 1991, Kanbur and Keen, 1993). In-
deed, if the difference in country size is large enough, the smaller country generates 
more revenue under tax competition than in its absence. Intuitively, this is because for 
the small country, the revenue loss from a tax cut – i.e. revenue forfeited from the (ini-
tially small) domestic tax base – is relatively minor compared to the major revenue gain 
from the inflow of part of the (initially large) foreign tax base of the other country. 
Hence, the small country faces a more elastic supply of the mobile tax base than its 
large competitor. In equilibrium, it will undercut the rate of the large country and attract 
a disproportionately large share of the internationally mobile tax base. There is a clear 
                                                 
2  We use tax harmonization here as a catch-all term for cooperative measures to curb tax competition. 
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“advantage of ‘smallness’” in tax competition (Wilson, 1999 278). Tax competition is 
asymmetric3. 
Asymmetric tax competition has ambiguous effects on fiscal democracy. The overall 
effect is negative because the competitive dynamics constrain the taxing capacity of the 
group of competing countries as a whole. The effect for the small country is positive, 
however. It gains in revenue raising capacity and hence gains in policy options for de-
mocratic choice. Yet, what the small country gains, the large country loses even more. 
The effect of tax competition on national fiscal democracy is clearly negative for this 
country. As a consequence, tax harmonization to curb tax competition is likely to be 
contested between the large country (which potentially benefits) and the small country 
(which potentially loses). Asymmetric tax competition is a matter of common concern 
for voters and governments in all competing countries but not a matter that lends itself 
easily to commonly acceptable solutions.  
So much on the theory of tax competition, what about its reality? To the extent that 
tax competition exists, the baseline model leads us to expect three major tax policy 
trends:  
(1) Race towards the bottom: a downward trend in tax rates and tax revenues as 
countries engage in interactive tax cutting.  
(2) Asymmetry: a pronounced tendency of small countries to undercut the tax 
rates of large countries, and raise more tax revenue from mobile bases.  
(3) Redistribution: a shift of mobile tax base from large to small countries (inter-
national redistribution) and a shift of tax burden from mobile to immobile tax 
bases (domestic redistribution).  
A lot of high-powered econometric research has gone into evaluating these predictions. 
Most of this research is narrowly focused on corporate taxation. The findings are mixed. 
Results vary with prediction tested, time frame, sample selection, and measure of the 
corporate tax burden. In this paper, we take a different approach. Based on simple indi-
cators on all three predictions, we show that the existence of tax competition is more 
obvious and straightforward than much of the econometric research makes it appear. 
The analysis starts in the 1980s (before the onset of deep economic integration) and 
ends in 2007 (the last year before the financial crash and for most variables also the last 
year for which data were available) and covers all major taxes. 
                                                 
3  Cross-national differences in wealth, location and domestic institutions can also create asymmetric effects under 
tax competition (see Baldwin and Krugmann 2002; Basinger and Hallerberg 2004; Plümper, Troeger and Winner 
2009; Hays 2009). 
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3. TAX COMPETITION AND TAX RATES  
Does tax competition trigger a race to the bottom in tax rates? Does it cause country 
size-related asymmetries in tax rate levels? In order to investigate these questions, it is 
important to distinguish two modes of tax competition: general and targeted (Keen, 
2001; Kemmerling/ Seils 2009). Under general tax competition, governments vie for 
mobile tax base by cutting general tax rates such as, for instance, the standard corporate 
tax rate. Under targeted tax competition, by contrast, they compete for mobile tax base 
by offering preferential tax treatment specifically for particularly mobile parts of the 
base. Think of special corporate tax regimes as an example, which reduce the level of 
taxation selectively on specific corporate forms and functions such as foreign-held 
companies, companies located in special business zones, holding companies, and cap-
tive insurance. 
Figures 1a and 1b provide evidence on general tax competition. Figure 1a tracks his-
torical trends in four general tax rates. It shows a dramatic fall of the corporate tax rate 
(down, on OECD-22 average, from 46 percent in 1985 to less than 30 percent 2007). 
The top personal income tax rate also fell by 16 percentage points but from a higher 
initial level (63 percent in 1985 down to 47 percent in 2007). The VAT rate increased 
(from roughly 11 percent in 1985 to roughly 18 percent in 2007). The tax wedge4 of an 
average wage earner (single, no children) has been more or less stable since the mid-
1980s (at around 28 percent). In short, there is evidence of a pronounced race towards 
the bottom in general corporate tax rates and a relatively less pronounced downward 
trend in top personal income tax rates but not in tax wedges or VAT rates. 
Figure 1: Tax rates, OECD-22 averages 
1a) Historical trends 1b) Correlations with Country Size 
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4  The tax wedge refers to the sum of personal income tax and employee social security contributions together with 
any payroll tax, expressed as a percentage of labor costs. 
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Figure 1b tracks the correlation of the general tax rates and country size of OECD-22 
countries over time5. If tax competition has indeed asymmetric effects on small and 
large countries, as the baseline model suggests, we should observe a positive correlation 
of tax rates and country size. The correlation should gain in strength over time as the 
level of market integration, and, hence, competitive pressure increases. This is indeed 
what we find for the corporate tax rate. The correlation of the corporate tax rate with 
country size increased from 0.21 in 1985 to 0.63 in 2007, indicating a growing tendency 
of small states to undercut the corporate tax rates of large states. Much of the empirical 
literature takes this as strong evidence of increasing competitive pressure (Devereux, 
Griffith and Klemm 2002; Ganghof, 2006; Plümper, Troeger and Winner 2009; Gen-
schel and Schwarz 2011). All other correlations are negative or show no clear trend. In 
sum, figure 1b suggests that general tax competition affects corporate tax rates but not 
personal income rates, tax wedges or VAT rates. 
Table 1 presents evidence on targeted tax competition. The countries are arranged 
according to country size (column 2). Column 3 provides information on targeted com-
petition in corporate taxation. While there has been strong anecdotal evidence of the 
spread of special corporate tax regimes since the 1980s, systematic internationally com-
parative time-series data has been lacking (Kemmerling and Seils 2009). The best we 
can do is to list the number of “potentially harmful” corporate tax regimes identified by 
the OECD among its member states in 2000 (OECD, 2006). The list shows that all 
OECD countries but four have adopted one or more special corporate tax regime sug-
gesting that targeted competition is widespread in corporate taxation. The correlation 
between country size and number of special corporate tax regimes is negative but small: 
large states are only slightly less likely to have such regimes than small states. Closer 
inspection suggests that domestic institutions may matter more for the probability of 
adopting special corporate tax regimes. The number of such regimes tends to be high 
among continental welfare states (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, and Switzerland) and Mediterranean states (Greece, Italy, Portugal but not Spain) 
but low among Anglo-Saxon economies (Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, 
United States but not Canada and Ireland) and Nordic welfare states (Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden).  
Targeted competition in personal income taxation focuses mainly on high wage pro-
fessionals and private investors. There is widespread anecdotal evidence of countries 
offering special tax regimes for foreign professionals (“expats”) temporarily working in 
the domestic economy in order to attract human capital and the multinational companies 
                                                 
5  Following standard practice, we operationalize country size as the logarithm of population size in order to damp-
en the impact of very small and very large countries on the correlation. 
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Table 1: Targeted Tax Rates 
 Top Rate on Personal Interest Income 
 
Country Size 
(Mio. Pop) 
Special  
Corporate Tax 
Regimes Residents Non-Residents 
 2000 2000 1985 2007 1985 2007 
Luxembourg 0.5 3 57 10b) 0 0 
NZ 3.8 0 ... ... ... ... 
Ireland 3.9 2 65 20b) 35 0 
Norway 4.5 1 64 .40 0 ... 
Finland 5.2 1 ... 28b) ... 0 
Denmark 5.4 0 73 59 0 0 
Switzerland 7.3 2 39 40 35 15 
Austria 8.1  67 25b) 5 0 
Sweden 8.9 1 80 30b) 0 0 
Portugal 10.4 3 60 20b) 13,8 20 
Belgium 10.3 5 25b) 15b) 25 15 
Greece 10.6 4 63 10
b) 56,8 10 
Netherlands 16.2 7 72 52 0 0 
Australia 19.7 1 ... ... ... ... 
Canada 31.4 3 50 46 25 25 
Spain 40.5 1 66 43 18 0 
Italy 58.0 2 12,5b) 27b) 21,6 27 
UK 59.2 0 60 40 30 0 
France 59.5 2 65 48 25 16 
Germany 82.6 2 56 47 0 0 
Japan 127.6 0 75 20b) 20 15 
United States 283.0 1 50 42 30 30 
OECD-22  1,95 57,87 33,10 17,91 9,11 
Correlation a)  -0,16 -0,13 0,38 0,25 0,49 
Notes: a) correlations are with the population logarithm b) scheduler taxation  
Data sources: population: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=254 ; Special corporate tax regimes; OECD 2006 
Top rate on personal interest income: Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Die wichtigsten Steuern im internationalen 
Vergleich, several issues 
employing it (PWC, 2005). For example, Sweden provides tax incentives to foreignex-
perts residing no longer than five years in the country, the Netherlands have tax incen-
tives for foreign experts, artists and sportsmen; and Spain, until recently, offered a spe-
cial rate of only 24% to football players (“Lex Beckham”). Unfortunately, lack of inter-
nationally comparative data prevents us from presenting systematic data for all OECD-
22 countries. Data is available, by contrast, on targeted competition for private invest-
ment income. We focus on interest income. As a rule, interest income is fully taxable in 
the residence country of the investor with a tax credit given for any withholding tax 
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charged by the source country of the investment. In practice, however, the investor may 
evade residence-country taxation by not reporting their foreign interest income. Gov-
ernments can compete for interest income in two ways. First, they can selectively cut 
the top personal income tax rate on resident interest income so as to reduce the incentive 
for domestic investors to engage in outbound tax evasion (column 4 and 5). Second, 
they can reduce their withholding taxes on the interest income of foreign investors so as 
to attract inbound investment of non-residents (column 6 and 7).  
The standard approach to cutting the tax burden on resident investors is to tax inter-
est income outside the framework of the progressive personal income tax at low propor-
tional rate (so-called “schedular taxation”). As column 4 shows, only two of the OECD-
22 countries applied a schedular approach in 1985. By 2007, however, 10 out of the 20 
OECD-countries did so (column 5). The spread of schedular taxation has caused the top 
rate on resident personal interest income to fall faster than the top personal income tax 
rate. While the latter fell by only 16 percentage points, on OECD-22 average, between 
1985 and 2007 (see figure 1a), the former went down by 25 percentage points from 58 
percent (1985) to 33 percent (2007). Personal interest income is now often taxed at sub-
stantially lower rates than personal income from other sources. The rate gap between the 
(low) tax rate on resident personal interest income and the (high) top personal income 
tax rate was as wide as 14 percentage points, on OECD-22 average, in 2007. The rate of 
interest income taxation is now positively correlated with country size (0.38 in 2007) as 
the baseline model would predict: small countries are more likely to have low interest 
income tax rates (and to adopt a schedular approach to interest income taxation) than 
large countries. At the same time, governments have also cut the withholding tax burden 
on non-resident interest income. As columns 6 and 7 show, the withholding tax rate 
dropped from averagely 18 percent in 1985 to 9 percent in 2007. There is also a positive 
association with country size (0.49 in 2007): Small states are more likely to charge no 
or low withholding taxes than large states. In conclusion, while governments tried to 
stem outbound tax evasion of domestic residents by targeted cuts on resident interest 
income, they vied for inbound tax evasion of foreign investors by reducing the with-
holding taxes on non-resident interest income.  
The evidence presented in this section suggests that tax rate competition has in-
creased since the 1980s. Corporate taxation is now subject to strong general and tar-
geted tax competition. Personal income taxation is subject to strong targeted competi-
tion for interest income and arguably some limited competition for highly qualified la-
bour (“expats”). But there is no indication that the drop in top personal income tax rates 
was caused by general tax competition. There is also no evidence of tax competition in 
VAT or in the tax wedge on the average production worker.  
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4. TAX COMPETITION AND TAX REVENUES  
Does tax rate competition matter for tax revenues? Looking at figure 2a, it is far from 
obvious that it does. As the figure shows, the trend in total tax revenues is up, not down. 
On OECD-22 average, they increased from roughly 35 percent of GDP in 1985 to 
roughly 37 percent in 2007. The budget balance also improved. While budget deficits 
oscillated around 4 percent of GDP over the 1980s and early 1990s, budgets were close 
to balance, over the business cycle, for most of the 2000s6. Even if we focus on corpo-
rate taxation, arguably the “most well-supported case” (Devereux and Sørensen, 2006: 
14) of tax competition, there is no clear cut evidence of a race to the bottom in tax reve-
nues. A huge empirical literature has tried to estimate the influence of economic open-
ness on capital tax revenues – with mixed results. Some studies find a positive relation-
ship: economic openness is associated with more capital taxation (e.g. Quinn, 1997, 
Garrett and Mitchell, 2001). Some find a negative relation: openness is associated with 
less capital taxation (Rodrik, 1997, Winner, 2005, Schwarz, 2007, Devereux et al., 
2008). And some find essentially no relation at all (e.g. Swank, 2006, Slemrod, 2004). 
On average, corporate tax revenues have increased in OECD-22 countries by almost a 
quarter, from roughly 3 percent of GDP in 1981 to close to 4 percent in 2007 (figure 
2a)7.  
Figure 2: Revenues and Deficits, OECD-22 averages 
2a) Historical trends 2b) Correlations with Country size 
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Sources: OECD Stat Extracts, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx? 
Yet, a closer look at the reasons behind the increase in corporate tax revenues warns 
against denying revenue effects of tax competition lightly. First, governments have part-
ly compensated the negative revenue effects of falling statutory tax rates by tax base 
broadening, e.g. by curtailing tax credits, depreciation allowances and deductions 
                                                 
6  What happened to public deficits after 2007 is, of course, a different story entirely. 
7  Not shown in the figure, corporate tax revenues declined rapidly in the wake of the financial crisis 2008. 
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(Stewart and Webb, 2006). As the tax base grows broader and broader, the scope for 
this compensation strategy shrinks. The probability of future tax cuts having negative 
revenue effects increases. This suggests that the revenue effects of corporate tax compe-
tition may become felt with a time lag. Second, rising corporate tax revenues are driven 
by an increase in the underlying macro-economic tax base. The share of corporate in-
come (profits and capital gains) in national income has risen continuously since the 
1980s (see also table 3 below). The positive revenue effect of this increase has partly 
offset the negative effects of competitive rate cuts (Kramer 1998). Third, the increase in 
corporate profitability is partly endogenous to corporate tax competition. To some ex-
tent, the endogeneity is purely statistical: tax competition increases inward FDI and 
profit shifting into small countries and thus increases the share of corporate profits in 
these countries (table 3 below). The uneven number of small and large countries leads 
to an increase of (unweighted) average profitability. To some extent, the endogeneity is 
real: the competitive downward pressure on corporate tax rates creates an increasing gap 
(in relative terms and sometimes even in absolute terms) between low corporate and 
high top personal income tax rates (see table 4 below). This gap encourages domestic 
income shifting from the personal into the corporate sector: Corporations turn into on-
shore tax shelters for rich individuals (Ganghof and Genschel, 2008). According to one 
estimate, a one percentage point increase in the gap between the top personal tax rate on 
interest income and the statutory corporate tax rate induces a 2.6 percent increase in the 
share of private savings channelled through the corporate sector (Devereux and Søren-
sen, 2006: 12). Another study suggests that a reduction of the corporate tax rate by 10 
percentage-points will raise the share of incorporated businesses in total business, and 
hence the corporate tax base by seven percent (de Mooij and Ederveen, 2008: 682).  
What do the correlation data reported in figure 2b add to this debate? As the figure 
shows, the level of total tax revenues is negatively associated with country size (- 0.34 
in 2007): large countries collect less tax revenue than small countries. While this is in 
line with the predictions of the baseline model, it is unlikely to be caused by tax compe-
tition. First, the negative correlation predates the onset of deep economic integration in 
the 1990s and does not discernibly increase thereafter. Second, small states have higher 
spending requirements than large states because the provision of public goods such as 
defence, monetary, financial and regulatory institutions, technical infrastructure or em-
bassies is often subject to economies of scale. This forces small states to spend more in 
per capita terms on public goods provision than large states, and, hence, to tax more, all 
else equal (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore, 2003: 3).  
The picture is different with respect to corporate tax revenues (figure 2b). While cor-
porate revenues were essentially unrelated to country size over the 1980s (oscillating 
between -0.1 in 1981 and 0.13 in 1989), the correlation coefficient drops dramatically 
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over the 1990s, reaches a low of -0.63 in 2002 and stays negative thereafter (-0.28 in 
2007): Over the 2000s, large OECD countries have been collecting significantly less 
corporate tax revenues than their smaller peers as the baseline model would predict. To 
be sure, the corporate tax is not a major revenue raiser in OECD-countries so that the 
absolute revenue effect may be small. Yet, even marginal revenue losses (or gains for-
gone) are politically painful for governments constrained by high levels of mandatory 
expenditure. Also, the revenue losses (or gains foregone) from corporate taxation may 
just be the tip of the iceberg of hard to measure losses from other mobile capital tax 
bases such as personal capital income. This view is supported by the data on budget 
deficits. While budget deficit tended to be slightly higher in small countries during the 
1970s and early 1980s (0.13 in 1981), the correlation coefficient fell dramatically over 
the 1990s, largely in step with that of corporate tax rates. The correlation reached a low 
of -0.63 in 2002, and stayed negative for the rest of the 2000s (-0.5 in 2007): Large 
states (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) ran large budget 
deficits, while many small states recorded budget surpluses (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden). This is consistent with the idea that tax 
competition helped small countries to reduce their reliance on debt by increased reve-
nues from corporate profits and other mobile forms of capital income, and also through 
positive knock-on effects on labour taxation. To the extent that the influx of foreign 
capital drives up labour demand and wages, it tends to improve revenues from labour 
taxation as well.  
To further explore this idea we perform a simple regression analysis of budget defi-
cits in OECD-22 countries (Table 2). Our expectation is that high corporate tax reve-
nues should be associated with low budget deficits: As tax competition enhances the 
capacity of small states (and restricts that of large states) to collect revenues from corpo-
rate profits and other forms of mobile capital, their budget balance should improve. 
Hence, corporate tax revenues should be positively associated with the budget balance. 
In order to assess this prediction, we control for two other variables which potentially 
influence the budget balance. One is economic growth (in terms of GDP). High growth 
rates reduce deficits by decreasing outlays on unemployment benefits and other coun-
tercyclical social transfers, and by increasing the yield of progressive taxes (Darby and 
Melitz, 2008). The other is country size. As various authors have argued, tax competi-
tion is not the only way in which small states benefit from economic openness. They 
also benefit because their small size allows them to specialize on, and live handsomely 
off, developing comparative advantage in exclusive niches of global product and ser-
vices markets (Streeck, 2000), and because their high degree of economic openness en-
ables them to externalize part of the costs of fiscal adjustment on foreign countries 
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(Laurent and Cacheux, 2007). Thus, even at a given level of corporate tax revenues we 
expect small open economies to have lower deficits than large countries.  
The results presented in table 2 are in line with expectations. The coefficients of cor-
porate tax revenues and country size are sizeable and have the predicted sign. Corporate 
tax revenue is positively associated with the budgetary balance, country size negatively. 
The significance of both variables increases over time. The impact of growth, by con-
trast, is relatively small, has no clear direction and is insignificant at all times. The 
model fit has been improving over time. In 2007, the model explained almost 70 percent 
of the variance in budget deficits. With the exception of 2007 a 1 percent point increase 
of corporate tax revenues as a share of GDP improves the budget balance by roughly 1 
percent point. The effect is larger in 2007 perhaps due to cyclical overheating in that 
year.  
Table 2: Explaining the size of budget deficits in OECD-21 countries, 1992-2007  
 1992 1997 2002 2007 
Corporate Tax Revenue 
(% of GDP)  
1.11 
(1.57) 
0.98 
(2.42)** 
1.05 
(2.49)** 
1.67 
(5.63)*** 
GDP Growth  0.28 
(0.82) 
0.29 
(1.14) 
-0.08 
(-0.34) 
-0.43 
(-0.73) 
Ln Population  -0.31 
(-0.67) 
-0.53 
(-1.36) 
-0.78 
(-1.53) 
-1.10 
(-2.31)** 
Nobs 21 21 21 21 
Adj. R2 15.7 42.3 47.7 68.2 
Notes: a= t-values are shown in parentheses; Three, two, or one asterisk represents a corresponding significance of 
1%-, 5%-, or 10%-level respectively. Dependent variable is overall government deficit scaled by GDP. 
This section holds three lessons on the revenue effects of tax competition: First, tax 
competition has not reduced the level of total taxation in OECD-22 countries. Second, 
tax competition has revenue effects at the level of selected taxes. As we have shown for 
the corporate tax, small states find their revenue raising capacity enhanced by tax com-
petition, large states constrained. Third, the tax competition has induced variance in 
revenue raising capacity partly accounts for the significant improvement in the budget-
ary position of small OECD countries since the 1980s and the persistence of chronic 
deficits in large countries.  
5. TAX COMPETITION AND REDISTRIBUTION 
According to the baseline model, tax competition redistributes mobile tax base from 
large to small countries (international redistribution), and tax burden from mobile to 
immobile tax bases, i.e. from capital to labour and consumption (domestic redistribu-
tion). We investigate both redistributive effects in turn. 
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International redistribution 
According to the baseline model, small countries will attract a disproportionately large 
share of the mobile tax base under tax competition (‘advantage of smallness’). We use 
two indicators to check this proposition: the share of corporate income (profits and capi-
tal gains) in GDP and employment created by inbound foreign direct investment as a 
share of the domestic labour force (table 3)8. Both indicators are broadly in line with the 
baseline model thus lending further support to the claim that tax competition partly ac-
counts for different trends in the corporate tax revenues and deficits of large and small 
countries (section 4).  
As table 3 shows, the share of corporate income in national income has increased, on 
average, from roughly 30 percent in 1995 to roughly 33 percent in 2007 in OECD-22 
countries. The correlation with country size is negative at both points in time (-0.56 and 
-0.54 respectively): small countries tend to have large shares of corporate income in 
national income due to the inflow of tax-sensitive corporate profits and investments (for 
a recent review of the tax sensitivity of corporate profits see de Mooij/ Ederven 2008).  
The picture is broadly similar if we turn to employment created by inward foreign 
investment (table 3). Manufacturing employment by foreign multinationals accounted 
for 2.6 percent of the total labour force of average OECD-22 countries in 1995 and 2.7 
percent in 2005. The employment share is negatively correlated with country size (-0.62 
and -0.64 respectively): small countries attract relatively more job creation by foreign 
firms than large states. Data on services employment is more limited. It suggests that 
the share of services employment in the total labour force has increased significantly. 
The negative correlation with country size is very strong in 2007 (-0.75). These data, 
limited as they may be, are in line with survey findings suggesting that the location of 
service activities is more sensitive to tax than the location of manufacturing activities 
(Ruding Report, 1992 102). Service establishments such as holding companies, finan-
cial services, coordination centres, or headquarters often serve as receiving ends of prof-
it shifting operations out of high-tax jurisdictions. Companies are particularly con-
cerned, therefore, to locate these service establishments in low-tax jurisdictions {see 
also Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux, 2010: 52-57). 
In conclusion, small countries do indeed attract a disproportionate share of the mo-
bile corporate tax base as the baseline model suggests. This brings fiscal advantages in 
terms of improved revenues as argued in section 4. It also has non-fiscal advantages 
such as better access to the technology of foreign firms (stimulating innovation and 
                                                 
8  Unfortunately, data on the share of non-resident capital income in total domestic capital income is not easily 
available. Thus, we present no evidence of the international distribution of the mobile personal capital income tax 
base. 
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growth), and higher levels of employment, and upward pressure on wages. The influx of 
foreign investments increases the relative scarcity of labour and hence pushes labour 
demand and the national average wage up (with positive knock-on effects on labour 
taxation!). Also, multinational companies usually pay wages above the national average. 
The markup is 40 percent, on average, in OECD countries (OECD own calculations). In 
fact, it is these positive employment effects rather than narrow fiscal reasons that moti-
vated Ireland to embrace tax competition as a strategy of national economic develop-
ment, and that motivated other countries, especially in Eastern Europe, to copy Ireland’s 
apparent success (Laurent and Cacheux, 2007).  
Table 3: International distribution of mobile tax base 
 
 
Corporate income  
as percentage of national income 
Employment by foreign MNE’s  
as percentage of the national labor force 
   manufacturing services 
 1995 2005 1997 2007 1997 2007 
Luxembourg 37 40 5,98 4,08 ... ... 
NZ ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Ireland ... 44 7,47 4,60 ... 6,55 
Norway 36 48 1,84 2,43 2,38 ... 
Finland 34 34 2,03 2,75 ... 5,01 
Denmark 28 28 1,65 2,90 ... ... 
Switzerland 27 28 ... 2,97 ... 5,13 
Austria 26 33 ... 4,25 2,32 7,18 
Sweden 32 28 3,05 4,59 3,01 6,68 
Portugal 30 28 1,65 1,92 0,96 ... 
Belgium 29 31 ... ... 5,77 4,09 
Greece ... 40 ... ... ... ... 
Netherlands 32 34 2,10 2,03 2,11 ... 
Australia 30 33 ... ... ... ... 
Canada 32 35 ... ... ... ... 
Spain ... 28 2,25 1,74 ... 3,34 
Italy 37 35 ... 1,87 ... 3,09 
UK 30 28 2,63 2,80 3,25 6,34 
France       
Germany 27 32 1,10 2,74 ... ... 
Japan ... 31 0,14 0,28 0,08 0,42 
United States 23 24 1,47 1,29 1,54 2,15 
OECD-22 30 33 2,60 2,74 2,38 4,34 
Correlation -0,56 -0,54 -0,62 -0,64 -0,40 -0,75 
Sources: own calculations from: OECD Stat Extracts, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx? 
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Domestic Redistribution 
According to the baseline model, tax competition shifts the (relative) tax burden from 
mobile to immobile tax bases, i.e. from capital to labour and consumption: The ratio of 
capital to labour taxes should fall (race to the bottom), and smaller countries should end 
up with lower ratios because they face stronger incentives to engage in competitive tax 
cutting than large countries (asymmetry). Various authors have tested these predictions 
by regressing different measures of the capital-labour tax ratio on batteries of independ-
ent variables including economic openness and country size for different country sam-
ples (Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Schwarz, 2007; Winner, 2005; Krogstrup, 2004; Kö-
nig/ Wagener; 2008; Garretsen/ Peters 2007; Bretschger/ Hettich, 2002). The results are 
not completely conclusive. Many studies confirm a negative effect of economic open-
ness on the capital-labour tax ratio: open borders are associated with relatively lower 
capital relative to labour taxes. Others do not find such evidence (e.g. Garrett and 
Mitchell, 2001). Also, some studies purport to show that small countries have lower 
capital to labour tax ratios than large countries (Winner, 2005; Schwarz, 2007; Garret-
sen and Peters, 2007), others don’t (König/Wagener, 2008, Haufler et al. 2009).  
We see at least two reasons why a competition-induced shift in tax burden may not 
unequivocally show up in lower capital to labour tax ratios. First, many studies use 
fixed effects estimators to gauge the effect of country size (operationalised by either 
population size or GDP) (Garretsen and Peters, 2007; Haufler et al. 2009, Devereux et 
al. 2008). This is problematic because these estimators measure the coefficients of a 
country’s deviations from its mean size only and cancel out cross-national differences in 
country size: they restrict the effect of country size to changes of a particular country’s 
size over time and fail to capture the effects of differences in size across countries at a 
given point in time. This makes it very difficult to identify any effect of country size on 
capital-labour tax ratios because cross-country variation is swept out of the data and 
within-country variation over time is very scarce. Second, those studies that do not use 
fixed effects estimator (for example: Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Schwarz, 2007) 
usually measure the average effect of country size on the capital-labour tax ratio over a 
certain period of time. This would have been fine if the time period had started in the 
1990s, i.e. after the onset of deep market integration. Most studies, however, range back 
to the 1970s thus lumping together time periods in which country size is unlikely to 
matter because market integration was shallow (1970s and 1980s), and time periods in 
which country size should matter because markets are deeply integrated (1990s and 
2000s).  
We cope with both problems by comparing different measures of the capital-labour 
tax ratio at two different points of time (1985 and 2007). Have the ratios fallen over 
time and has the correlation with country size increased? The ratios are computed from 
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the nominal tax rates analysed in section 3. Recall that important tax rates on mobile 
capital (the corporate tax rate and the tax rate on the resident interest income of private 
investors) have fallen considerably since 1985 while tax rates on immobile labour and 
consumption have either increased (VAT) or stagnated (tax wedge) or decreased by 
relatively less (top personal income tax rate). As a consequence, the ratios of capital tax 
rates to labour tax rates have generally fallen, indicating a shift of the nominal tax bur-
den from mobile to immobile bases (table 4). The fall has been most pronounced in the 
tax rate on personal interest income/ tax wedge ratio: while in 1985 the rate applied to 
resident personal interest income was 2.07 times higher than the tax wedge, it was only 
1.19 times higher in 2007.  
Table 4: Tax Rates and Ratios, OECD-22 averages 
 OECD-22 average Correlation with Country Size 
 1985 2007 1985 2007 
Tax rates     
capital     
CTRa) 46,1 29,7 0,21 0,63 
TRRIIb) 57,6 33,8 -0,12 0,34 
labour     
VAT 10,7 17,7 -0,10 -0,24 
Tax Wedge 28,0 27,8 -0,32 -0,06 
TPITRc) 63,4 46,9 -0,10 -0,08 
     
Tax Ratios     
CTR/VAT 2,53 2,23 0,42 0,37 
CTR/Tax Wedge 1,65 1,07 0,33 0,50 
CTR/TPITR 0,76 0,69 0,34 0,76 
TRRII/VAT 3,16 2,30 -0,29 0,36 
TRRII/Tax Wedge 2,07 1,19 0,18 0,45 
TRRII/TPITR 0,92 0,76 -0,08 0,25 
Notes: a) CTR = corporate tax rate; b) TRRII = tax rate on resident interest income (private investors); c) TPITR = 
top personal income tax rate 
Sources: CTR, TRPII, TPITR and VAT rate: Bundesministerium der Finanzen; Die wichtigsten Steuern im internati-
onalen Vergleich, several issues; Tax Wedge: OECD, Taxing Wages 
As table 4 also shows, the race towards the bottom in nominal tax rate ratios was ac-
companied by growing asymmetries between large and small countries. The correlations 
of tax ratios and country size have generally increased between 1985 and 2007, except 
for the corporate tax rate/VAT ratio. In 2007, all correlations are positive and most of 
them are quite sizeable indicating that small countries impose relatively lighter nominal 
tax burdens on mobile capital than large countries. To make sure a shift of the nominal 
tax burden from capital to labour does not translate one-to-one into a shift of the effec-
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tive tax burden. But as that nominal tax rates are important determinants of effective 
burdens, it is likely to have considerable impact. At the very least, therefore, our find-
ings add credence to empirical studies reporting economic openness and country size to 
significantly reduce the effective capital-labour tax ratio (e.g. Schwarz 2007, Winner 
2005). 
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR FISCAL DEMOCRACY 
The evidence presented in this paper offers strong support to the view that tax competi-
tion exists. We note three key findings. First, general and targeted tax rates on real, fi-
nancial, and human capital are racing towards the bottom since the 1980s while small 
countries systematically undercut the tax rates of large countries (section 3). Second, 
capital tax base moves from large to small countries (international redistribution) and 
the nominal tax burden shifts from capital to labour and consumption (domestic redis-
tribution) (section 5). Third, while the total level of tax revenues remains unaffected, 
small countries see their capacity to raise revenue from mobile capital increased, large 
countries decreased (section 4).  
The implications for fiscal democracy are ambiguous. First, tax competition has a 
negative effect on national tax autonomy: All competing countries – large and small – 
see their ability to tax mobile capital constrained. Governments have to tax immobile 
labor and consumption relatively more in order to meet mandatory spending require-
ments. The shift of the tax burden away from capital is borne out not only by the evi-
dence presented in section 4, but also by tax policy reactions to the recent financial cri-
sis. Blaming the financial sector for causing the crisis, policy makers throughout the 
political spectrum called for additional taxes in this sector to pay for part of the fiscal 
damage. While the G-20 initially endorsed this position and many governments intro-
duced some new levies at the national level, competitive pressure prevented the coordi-
nated introduction of financial transaction taxes (Brast, 2011). Instead, policy makers 
address their fiscal woes mostly by spending cuts and tax increases on labour and con-
sumption. As a close inspection of tax policy changes in EU member states 2008-2010 
reveals, tax increases are focused on excises, social security contributions and the VAT 
(Lierse and Seelkopf 2011). Even if governments manage to maintain total tax levels, 
their ability to make rich capital owners contribute erodes. Tax competition may thus 
contribute to increased income inequality between the very rich and the rest of society.  
Second, tax competition has also positive effects on fiscal democracy in small, pe-
ripheral low tax countries. Countries such as Ireland or Luxembourg have profited from 
the competition-induced inflow of mobile capital both directly in terms of corporate tax 
revenues and indirectly in terms of new jobs, upward pressure on wages and, as a con-
sequence of that, higher labour tax revenues. As Hannes Winner shows for a panel of 
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Table 5: Corporate tax rate changes 
 Corporate tax rate Change 
 2007 2011 2011-2007 
Luxembourg 29,6 28,8 -0,8 
NZ ... ...  
Ireland 12,5 12,5 0 
Norway 28 28 0 
Finland 26 26 0 
Denmark 25 25 0 
Switzerland 21,3 21,3 0 
Austria 25 25 0 
Sweden 28 26,3 -1,7 
Portugal 26,5 29 2,5 
Belgium 34 34 0 
Greece 25 20 -5 
Netherlands 25,5 25 -0,5 
Australia 30 30 0 
Canada 36,1 32,5 -3,6 
Spain 32,5 30 -2,5 
Italy 37,3 31,4 -5,9 
UK 30 27 -3 
France 34,4 34,4 0 
Germany 38,7 29,8 -8,9 
Japan 39,5 42 2,5 
United States 39 39 0 
OECD-22 29,7 28,4 -1,3 
Correlation  0,69 0,61 -0,26 
Source: Eurostat 2011, own calculations 
OECD countries, small countries have lower corporate and labour taxes than large ones, 
all else equal (Winner, 2005). This explains why left parties in small countries often 
support aggressive tax competition strategies. Take the insistence of the new Irish Fine 
Gael – Labour government to defend the low Irish corporate tax rate as an example. In 
effect, the government bets on international redistribution from other large countries 
rather than on domestic redistribution from capital to reach its economic and distribu-
tive goals. This may not be a bad bet. While Ireland was particularly hard hit by the 
financial crisis, it is recovering faster than other small victims of the crisis such as 
Greece which had never seized upon tax competition as a strategy of national economic 
development.  
Third, even if we accept that tax competition expands the scope for fiscal democracy 
in small countries, it does so by constraining fiscal democracy in large countries. Ac-
cording to the baseline model, large countries will accept exploitation by the small be-
cause the fiscal costs of fighting back are too high. This cannot be relied upon in the real 
world because large country governments may want to cut their taxes for purely domes-
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tic reasons. Thus, as table 5 shows, many large countries including Canada, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the UK have recently cut their corporate tax rate to reinvigorate their 
crisis-stricken economies. France and the US are also considering cuts.  
The recent wave of large country corporate tax rate cuts increases competitive pres-
sure on all countries. While large countries suffer relatively more from tax competition 
than small countries, they also have more power to bring tax competition about. Intui-
tively, if a large country cut its taxes, much more pressure would be put on other coun-
tries to also cut their rates than if a small country enforced a similar cut. As various au-
thors argued, it was the United States tax reform of 1986 which triggered the global 
downward competition in corporate taxation (Hallerberg and Basinger, 1998, Swank, 
2006). An equally dramatic tax cut in, for instance, Norway, would never have had an 
equal dramatic effect. It follows that large countries also have more power to mitigate 
tax competition. It is not the likes of Luxembourg, Estonia, and Ireland who hold the 
key to preventing a meltdown of capital taxation. It is the United States, Japan, Ger-
many, France, and other large countries. If the scope for democratic choice in capital 
taxation is to be retained, or enlarged, under conditions of tax competition, large coun-
tries will have to take the lead. They have to keep their tax rates up, in order to allow 
smaller states to cut their taxes by less. This preserves more options for fiscal policy 
choice for all countries but comes at a cost for the large countries. Benevolent hegem-
ony is not for free.  
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